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MARK ROWLANDS 
THE WOLF AND THE PHILOSOPHER 
 
Some years ago, I wrote a book called The Philosopher and the Wolf (Pegasus 2009). It 
should really have been called The Wolf and the Philosopher. The wolf is the star, the 
philosopher an insignificant extra bumbling around in the background. The book is about 
many things, but fundamentally, I suppose, it is about growing up. I’ve recently finished 
a sequel of sorts. It’s called Running with the Pack (Pegasus 2013) and it’s a book about 
growing old. There is, I suspect, a natural trilogy to be written here, but I hope I don’t 
have to write the final part for some time yet. 
 The Philosopher and the Wolf is a memoir: a book of memories. In this paper, I 
shall talk about this book, but I shall also talk with it. I shall talk not just about the 
memories the book contains but use these to examine the idea of memory.  
 
When I was twenty-seven, I did something a really rather stupid… 
Actually, I almost certainly did many stupid things that year—I was, after all, twenty-
seven—but this is the only one I remember because it went on to indelibly shape the 
future course of my life. When I first met Brenin, I was a young assistant professor of 
philosophy at the University of Alabama, and he was six-week old, a cuddly little teddy 
bear of a wolf cub. At least, he was sold to me as a wolf, but I think it is very likely that 
he was wolf-dog mix. Whatever he was, he grew up, and with this came various, let us 
call them, idiosyncrasies. If I left him unattended for more than a few minutes, he would 
destroy anything he could lay his jaws on—which, given that he grew to be thirty-five 
inches at the withers, included pretty much everything that wasn’t screwed to the ceiling. 
I don’t know if he was easily bored, had separation anxiety, or claustrophobia, or some 
combination of all of these things. But the result was that Brenin had to go everywhere I 
did. Any socializing I did—bars, parties, and so on—Brenin had to come too. If I went on 
a date, he would play the lupine gooseberry. I took him to lectures with me at the 
University. He would lie down and sleep in the corner of the lecture room: most of the 
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time anyway—when he didn’t things would get interesting. For example, you can 
probably imagine the circumstances that caused me to append this little cautionary note 
to my syllabus:  
Note: Please do not pay any attention to the wolf. He will not hurt you. 
However, if you do have any food in your bags, please ensure that those 
bags are securely fastened shut. 
I can’t be certain of this, of course, but I strongly suspect that this was the first time these 
three sentences had ever appeared on a philosophy syllabus.  
Allied to his destructive proclivities was his boundless energy. When Brenin was 
a cub, and then a young wolf, he liked to play a game: he would grab a cushion off the 
sofa or armchair on which I was sitting, and tear off out the garden, with me in hot 
pursuit. It was a game of chase, and he loved it. But when he started getting big, he 
decided to modify the game. One day, my reflections were interrupted by a sequence of 
loud thuds coming from the room that led out to the back yard. Instead of taking a 
cushion from the armchair and going out the garden, Brenin had decided that it would be 
far more rewarding to take the rest of armchair too. The thuds were made by the chair, 
locked firmly in Brenin’s jaws, being repeatedly slammed against the doorframe. I think 
it was at precisely this moment I decided that it would be a really, really good thing if 
Brenin were constantly exhausted. That thud-thud-thud of an armchair against a 
doorframe marked the beginning of a life of almost daily running. 
 
On Our Runs Together … 
A passage from The Philosopher and the Wolf records a memory of running.  
I realized something both humbling and profound: I was in the presence of 
a creature that was, in most important respects, superior to me. My 
realization was fundamentally an aesthetic one. When we were running, 
Brenin would glide across the ground with an elegance and economy of 
movement I have never seen in a dog. When a dog trots, no matter how 
refined and efficient its gait, there is always a small vertical vector present 
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in the movement of its feet, and this movement of the feet will transmit 
itself to the line of its shoulders and back. A wolf uses its ankles and large 
feet to propel it forwards. As a result there is far less movement in its 
legs—these remain straight and move forwards and backwards but not up 
and down. So, when Brenin trotted, his shoulders and back remained flat 
and level. From a distance, it looked like he was floating an inch or two 
above the ground. When he was especially happy or pleased with himself, 
this would be converted into an exaggerated bounce. But his default 
motion was the glide. Brenin is gone now and when I try to picture him it 
is difficult to furnish this picture with the details necessary to make it a 
concrete and living representation. But his essence is still there for me. I 
can still see it: the ghostly wolf in the early-morning Alabama mist, 
gliding effortlessly over the ground, silent, fluid and serene. 
The contrast with the noisy, puffing and leaden-footed thudding of 
the ape that ran beside him could not have been more pronounced or 
depressing. I wanted to be able to lope. I wanted to glide across the ground 
as if I were floating an inch or two above it. But no matter how good at 
running I became—and I became very good—this was always going to 
escape me. If you want to understand the soul of the wolf—the essence of 
the wolf, what the wolf is all about—then you should look at the way the 
wolf moves. And the crabbed and graceless bustling of the ape, I came to 
realize with sadness and regret, is an expression of the crabbed and 
graceless soul that lies beneath. 
      (The Philosopher and the Wolf, 84-6) 
As a result of having to share a life with a rootless and restless philosopher, 
Brenin became not only a highly educated wolf—the recipient of more free university 
education than any wolf that ever lived—but also, I suppose, a rather cosmopolitan wolf, 
moving with me from Alabama to Ireland, on to Wales, England, and finally to France. 
Here is a memory that is recorded in Running with the Pack: the memory of a run that 
took place a few days before we moved from Alabama to Ireland. 
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 This is a run of sadness… 
…a run of times that have gone and will never come again. This is a run of 
fear: a run of times as yet unknown. I will soon, in a few short days, be 
putting Brenin on a plane to Ireland, and quarantine, but at this moment he 
floats along beside me as we run through the early morning streets of 
Tuscaloosa. I was twenty-four when I moved here, fresh out of Oxford, 
and starting my first real job. I began Oxford-style. I went to work in 
blazer and flannels. I ended up grunge: t-shirts, shorts, flip-flops and a 
ponytail. I didn’t anticipate my first job turning into a seven-year party, 
but sometimes things have a funny way of turning out. After seven years, 
over a hundred rugby games, thousands of tequila shooters, and more 25c 
longneck beers than I can number, I am ready to leave Alabama. When I 
arrived here, I was younger than many of my students. So, it was perhaps 
not particularly surprising that I found my way into the University’s 
student rugby team, and the rather surreal sub-culture that surrounds it. 
But before I knew it I am thirty-one. I’m too old, and the party has moved 
on. There is only so long you can turn up at student parties—even student 
rugby parties—without it getting first a little sad, and after that a little 
creepy. I suspect I have already transgressed the borders of sad, and want 
to get the hell out of Dodge before I cross over into creepy. No one comes 
back from creepy. 
It is an early Sunday morning. We had a game the previous day, 
followed by the inevitable festivities, and so I am running off the party of 
the night before. My memories of those streets are pallid. In this respect 
they are not inaccurate, for the streets were also pallid. Once the blinding 
white porched-and-pillared abodes of respectable southern gentility, this 
part of town has been taken over by the students of the University of 
Alabama, and the houses are grey and cracked and peeling from all the 
young lives that have burned brightly within them. But my memories are 
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pallid and peeling for another reason. They were made in a time when I 
had little need for them. Age is not, in fact, the destroyer of memories; that 
belongs to youth. Age is the preserver of memories, the reverer of 
memories. The memories I make become stronger as I get older. The 
memories I made when I was young are sickly children. 
  (Running with the Pack, Ch. 4, “American Dreams”) 
 
Glance and Gesture, Nameless 
There is a memory I have that sits on my bookshelves, a memory frozen in time in the 
form of a photograph. It is a memory of Brenin and his dog friend, Nina, charging around 
the beach at Inchydoney, in County Cork, Ireland. On the back, some forgotten hand tells 
me that it is February 1998. I love this memory for many reasons. But the most important 
thing about this memory is not what it contains but what it does not. 
A couple of years after Nina—a German Shepherd/malamute mix—had joined us, 
Brenin unilaterally decided to further augment the pack. An unsanctioned rendezvous 
with a white German shepherd a few miles away resulted—63 days plus around five 
weeks later—in the addition of Tess. When the photograph was taken, when this memory 
was frozen, Tess did not yet exist. And yet there she is. There is an absence—a raggedy 
absence—that you would see if you could turn your attention to the (missing) top right 
hand corner. Tracking left, you would see some scratches and indentations. I rescued this 
photograph from the jaws of Tess. This raggedy absence is Tess, present as absent. It is 
Tess, Brenin’s daughter, impinging on a time before she was born. It is Tess saying, “I 
am here too,” even though she was not yet a glint in her wolf-father’s eye.  
When she chewed away at this photograph, Tess didn’t ruin it: she augmented it, 
added immeasurably to it. If the photograph were a memory, frozen in time, when Tess 
gnawed away at it, and thus encroached onto a time before she was born, she did not do 
so by altering the content of the memory but by altering its form. The content of the 
memory is what the memory is about, what it depicts. And this is till the same: it is still a 
depiction of two friends, charging around a beach on a rare sunny Irish day. If this 
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photograph were a memory, Tess would have altered its form—transformed it into a 
raggedy memory. Every memory has not just content but a form. Every memory has a 
shape.  
Some people say that it is our memories that make us who we are. Indeed, there is 
a well-known philosophical theory that says just that: it is my memories that make me the 
person I am, the same person today as I was yesterday, a different person from anyone 
else. This is known as the memory theory. Perhaps the theory is right—although I suspect 
not—but it is certainly ambiguous. If my memories make me who I am, is this “I” to be 
found in the content of my memories or in their form? 
The German poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, once said something that I think is both 
profoundly beautiful and profoundly true about memories: 
But it is still not enough to have memories. One must be able to forget 
them, if they are many, and have the great patience to wait for them to 
come again. For it is not the memories themselves. Only when they 
become blood in us, glance and gesture, nameless and no longer to be 
distinguished from ourselves, only then can it happen in a very rare hour, 
the first word of a line arises out of their midst and strides out of them. 
(The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge, trans. Burton Pike, Dalkey 
Archive Press 2008, 14) 
Rilke is talking here of the importance of memory for a poet, the role that memory plays 
in artistic creation. But I think his insight is true more generally. The most important 
memories are the ones that come again, and for this they must first be forgotten. When 
they come again, when they return to us, it is not in their original way. The memories that 
come again have become part of our blood, “glance and gesture, nameless and no longer 
to be distinguished from ourselves.” Their content has gone, but their form remains. This 
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The Prejudice of Content over Form 
Although I wasn’t familiar with the work of Rilke at the time, this idea was a continuing 
theme of The Philosopher and the Wolf. There, I argued that when we think of memory, 
we fall victim to what I called the “prejudice of conscious recall.” We might equally call 
it the “prejudice of content over form.” There is, I argued, a deeper way of remembering 
than the mere recall of content: 
But there are different ways of remembering. And when we think of 
memory, we overlook what is most important in favor of what is most 
obvious. A bird does not fly by flapping its wings: this is merely what 
gives it forward propulsion. The real principles of flight are to be found in 
the shape of the bird’s wings, and the resulting differences in air pressure 
on the upper and lower surfaces. But in our early attempts to fly, we 
overlooked what is most important in favor of what is most obvious: we 
built flapping machines. Our understanding of memory is similar. We 
think of memory as conscious experiences whereby we recall past events. 
But this is just the flapping of wings. These memories are not particularly 
reliable at the best of times, and are the first to fade as our brains begin 
their long, but inexorable, descent into indolence; like the flapping of a 
bird’s wings that gradually fades in the distance. 
     (The Philosopher and the Wolf, 45-6) 
The raggedy absence through which Tess announces her presence to a time before she 
was born is a reminder that there is another way of remembering. Here, again, The 
Philosopher and the Wolf: 
But there is another, deeper and more important, way of remembering: a 
form of memory that no one ever thought to dignify with a name. This is 
the memory of a past that has written itself on you, in your character and 
in the life on which you bring this character to bear. You are not aware of 
these memories: often they are not even the sorts of things of which you 
can be conscious. But they, more than anything else, make you what you 
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are. These memories are exhibited in the decisions you make, and the 
actions you take, and the life that you thereby live.  
It is in our lives, and not fundamentally in our conscious 
experiences, that we find the memories of those who are gone. Our 
consciousness is fickle, not worthy of the task of remembering. When 
someone is worth remembering, then being a person they have helped 
fashion and living a life they have helped forge: these are not only the 
ways in which we remember them; they are the ways in which we honor 
them. 
(The Philosopher and the Wolf, 46) 
 
Nothing Brightly Embossed on Them … 
These passages advert to the relative persistence of the form of memories over their 
content. Even when their contents are no longer available to us, memories have a form 
that continues to guide us, to shape our lives in various ways, for good or for ill. This is 
what Rilke meant when he wrote of memories becoming part of our blood. There is, 
however, more to it than merely the persistence of form. There is also an issue of 
ownership. I suspect the form of my memories is mine in a way that their content can 
never be. The form of my memories belongs to me in a way their content never can. This 
was also a theme of The Philosopher and the Wolf.  
Often my memories of Brenin are tinged with a strange sort of 
amazement. It’s as if the memories are made up of partially overlapping 
images: one senses that the images are connected in an important way, but 
they’re too blurred to make out. And then they suddenly converge—snap 
into focus—like images in an old kaleidoscope. I remember Brenin next to 
me, striding the touchlines of the rugby pitch in Tuscaloosa. I remember 
him sitting next to me at the post-match party, when pretty Alabama girls 
would come up and say: I just love your dog. I remember him running 
with me through the streets of Tuscaloosa; and when the Tuscaloosa city 
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streets transformed into lanes of an Irish countryside I remember the pack 
running next to me, easily matching its stride to mine. I remember Brenin, 
his daughter Tess and his friend Nina, bouncing like salmon through the 
seas of barley. I remember Brenin dying in my arms in the back of the 
Jeep. And when the convergence of images happens, I think: is that really 
me? Was it really me that did those things? Is that really my life? 
This realization sometimes strikes me as a faintly surreal 
discovery. That I am in these memories at all is not given: sometimes it is 
a fortuitous bonus that must be discovered.  
     (The Philosopher and the Wolf, 242) 
Memories have both form and content. Their content is something I recall. But there is 
nothing brightly embossed on this content that reads: “Property of Mark Rowlands.” 
Sometimes, the most I can hope for is that some forgotten hand will have scrawled 
something on the back.  
 
A Wind Blowing Towards the World 
Why would my memories show themselves to me in such a way that my ownership of 
them should sometimes strike me as a “faintly surreal discovery”? When I remember, I 
am—so I’m told—aware of the content of my memories—of what my memories depict. 
And, far from making me what I am, I suspect the content of my memories really is not 
part of me at all. The French existentialist philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, reached a 
similar conclusion: “All consciousness… is consciousness of something. This means that 
there is no consciousness that is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, 
that consciousness has no ‘content’” (Being and Nothingness, trans Hazel Barnes, 
Philosophical Library 1956, 11) Consciousness has no content—there is nothing in it. 
Consciousness is nothing—a little pocket of nothingness that has insinuated itself into the 
heart of being.  
 “All consciousness is consciousness of something.” This has a clear, but striking, 
consequence: nothing I am aware of can be part of my consciousness. Everything I am 
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aware of is outside my consciousness. At one time, many years ago, I would have been 
standing on a beach with Brenin and Nina. Obviously, Brenin and Nina are not part of my 
consciousness. But, if Sartre is correct, neither is my memory of them. When I remember 
Brenin and Nina on the beach at Inchydoney, does an image flash before my mind, like 
an old photograph? But the image, in itself, could mean anything at all: it might depict 
two dogs on a beach. It might depict play. It might depict happiness. In principle, the 
image might mean any number of things. The image, taken in-itself, has no intentionality. 
In-itself it is not about anything. It can be about something—it can mean or signify 
something—but only when it is interpreted. And, for Sartre, what provides the 
interpretation is consciousness. 
Consciousness is intrinsically of or about something. It is, as philosophers call it, 
intentional. But the content of memory is not about anything—not taken in itself. The 
conclusion, Sartre realized, is that the content of memory is not part of consciousness. 
And, if I am consciousness, this means the content of my memory is not part of me.  
 
The Death Run 
The final memory is really a juxtaposition of two memories, separated by a decade, and 
recorded in Running with the Pack.  
Brenin has lymphoma, the vet tells me, and the prognosis is what, in the 
profession, they call “guarded.” In other words, he is going to die. It is 
going to be soon, and my primary duty now, the last important thing I can 
do for my old friend, is to make his death as easy as it can be. As easy as it 
can be for him, I mean. That probably means making it hard for me. If he 
could just slip away in the night, painlessly, unaware … but I suspect that 
is not the way it is going to be. I am going to have to make a decision, a 
final judgment. The judgment will be that Brenin’s life is no longer worth 
living. Not a second less of a life worth living, and not a second more of a 
life that is not. That is the goal. Then I will have to take him to the vet, and 
I will have to ask the vet to kill him. I suspect that whatever decision I 
make will always be riddled with doubt. Years later, I will ask myself: 
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Was that the right day? Did I get it right? Was it too soon? Or was I too 
slow, already too late—too weak?  
We have just returned from taking Nina and Tess to boarding 
kennels, for a few days. They are still young, exhausting to be around; and 
I decided Brenin might benefit from a short rest, a break from their 
grinding effervescence. Upon our return, I quickly notice a change in 
Brenin’s demeanour. Brighter, more alert, more interested, hungrier than 
he has been in weeks—I offer him the spaghetti I had made for my lunch 
and he quickly devours it. Then he does something altogether unexpected. 
He jumps onto the sofa and howls. 
When he was a young wolf, Brenin had a little party piece that he 
would perform most days. He would run, full tilt, at the settee, jump on to 
it, and then continue his run up the wall. When he had got as high as his 
momentum would carry him, which was typically around three-quarters of 
the way up a standard living room wall, he would spin his back legs up 
and around—a kind of canine cartwheel—and then run back down the 
wall. This was his way of letting me know we had been dawdling in the 
house for far too long, and that it was time for a run. Time had stripped 
him of this sort of outrageous athleticism—jumping on the settee and 
howling had become his middle-aged substitute. Still, I know exactly what 
he is suggesting. 
There is a ditch at the end of the garden, and when we get there, 
Brenin begin to run up and down it, over to the trees on the other side and 
back again: a display of excitement of the sort I have not seen—not from 
him anyway—in a number of years. When we left the house, I had 
envisaged a gentle stroll, an opportunity to sniff a few smells, and mark a 
little territory. But something in his behaviour, perhaps it was a glint in his 
almond eye, convinces me that something strange is happening. And so 
we do something that even now I still cannot quite believe. 
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I had not been running for the best part of a year. Whenever I tried, 
Brenin, more than a decade old now, would soon start lagging behind. I 
think it had been the look of desperation on his face, the desperation that 
goes with understanding that your body will not do what you want it to 
anymore that convinced me to stop running. Nina and Tess could still run 
all day, of course. But I couldn’t do this to my old wolf brother, and so my 
running with the pack had transformed into gentle walks.  
So, this is how we begin our last run together. I quickly put on 
some shorts, dig out my neglected running shoes, and we set off through 
the woods, along a narrow path that brought us out to the Canal du Midi. 
For the first couple of miles we run in the shadows of the giant sycamores. 
If this had been July, the trees would have been a blessing. But it wasn’t, 
and they weren’t. This was January; we are only a few days into the New 
Year. The tramontane—the mountain wind—tasting of the snows of 
Lozère and Auvergne, sweeps down between the trees, a sycamore wind 
tunnel. This is a run as cold as death. Every run has its own heartbeat, and 
this is the beat of a heart that is cold. The barren, leafless branches of 
those giant plane trees dance to the wind of snow and mountains. Our feet 
are soundless; our breath, and the jingle, jingle, jingle of Brenin’s chain 
are lost in the wind. We are not here.  
I had expected Brenin to tire quickly. I had expected a quick return 
to the house. But he does not tire. Not a bit: he drifts, apparently without 
effort, over the ground beside me, almost like the Brenin of old—almost 
as if he was floating an inch or two above the earth; almost as if he wasn’t 
dying.  
There is a turn off from the Canal, down a little dirt track that runs 
along the edges of the village’s vineyards. I was getting a little worried, 
because we were approaching the furthermost point of the run from our 
house. The cancer has robbed Brenin of a considerable amount of his 
weight. But, even so, he is still around 120 lbs., and I really do not relish 
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the prospect of having to carry him three miles home. But he glides on, 
apparently inconvenienced by the death that grows inside him. After about 
a mile, the track swings south and brings us to the eastern edge of the 
grande maïre.  
The sun warms us slightly, now we have left the trees behind. Even 
the tramontane can’t quite take that away from a sun that has begun its 
slow afternoon descent into the sea, and dances fiercely on the wind-
worried waters of the maïre. After a mile or so of tracking the lagoon, we 
reach the digue, the dyke built to stop the storm surges of the winter 
Mediterranean. We run along here for half a mile or so, and then turn 
south again, and we soon reach the beach. 
 It is here that we rest and sit in the dying January sun, watching 
the waves wash gently onto the golden sands. The sun sinks slowly over 
the snow-peaked Canigou, nestled in the mountains that wrapped around 
the coast, south down to Spain. 
The empty house is waiting for both of us. But, for a while at least, 
we sit and watch the sun. 
          (Running with the Pack, Ch. 6, “The Digue”) 
Ten years later I find myself on that same beach. I have built sandcastles, surrounded by a 
system of moats that would not have embarrassed Pierre Paul Riquet, the man who built 
the Canal du Midi. The sole purpose of these sandcastles is to be destroyed at some 
subsequent time to be determined by my two sons. Running from distance, they perform 
graceless belly flops on the castles, hitting the sand hard, yipping like hyenas over and 
over again, aided and abetted by Hugo, the dog of their childhood, who bounds along 
beside them barking and frothing like a dog in the grip of la rage. I might have played 
this game once. But then I became old and didn’t understand it any more.  
I suspect children, and the dogs of children, understand what is important in life 
far better than adults. When I build the sandcastles, it is work. I do it for the enjoyment of 
my sons. When they destroy those castles, it is play: they do this for no other reason than 
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to do it. As the castles die the death of a thousand belly flops, I can think of no more 
emphatic affirmation of the value of play over work. There is a joy that goes with this—
the joy of giving yourself over wholly to the activity and not the outcome, the deed and 
not the goal. Perhaps I can no longer understand the game; but I can see the joy, I can feel 
it: I can hear it echoing out across the water towards Africa. 
And yet: we are not far away. I can see it. We’re no more than a few metres away 
from the place where I once sat with a dying wolf, and watched the cold winter sun set 
slowly on his life. That this life, this single pathway through space and time should 
contain both memories: this is what seems so improbable to me. This is what, for me, is a 
“faintly surreal discovery.” 
 
A Raggedy Absence in the Real 
The content of memory is transient. There is nothing brightly embossed on it that 
decisively indicates ownership. And when placed side by side, the contents of memories 
are dubiously coherent. If my memories make me who I am, I can only conclude they do 
not do so in virtue of their content. If I am to be found in my memories at all, it will be in 
their form. But what is the form of memory? 
Here, we are at the limits of language: for the function of language is to express 
content. And so I can only fall back on metaphor. Form is what shapes content. If I am to 
be found in the form of my memories, then I am the traces left on the contents of 
memories. I am the scratches, indentations, and tooth marks left in these contents. The 
contents of my memories—they could be the contents of anyone’s memories. What 
makes them mine are the marks I have left on them, the marks that shape them. Every 
mark, every trace: that is me saying, “I am here too!”  
Content is what is the case. The world is a totality of content, a totality of facts 
not things. Shape is always, ultimately, a gap, a lacuna in content. If I am to be found in 
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